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Abstract 
Despite the new geopolitical situation caused by the revolution at Maidan in February 
2014, little is known about the real economics of Ukraine and its internal spatial disparities. 
In the survey of regional disparities, data on incomes, employment and unemployment 
were involved and completed by those on migration and age structure of the population. 
The spectrum of available data at rayon level is not particularly broad, but this is 
counterbalanced by the ca. five hundred territorial units that provide a minute picture of 
the inequalities. According to the classic view, the spatial pattern of economic development 
is opposite to the Central European west to east slope. In Ukraine, Eastern regions are not 
more developed as a whole but they accommodate more developed large urban centres. 
Spatial differences grew most rapidly during the period of economic decline (1990–2000). 
However, these disparities were mitigated during the two years following the global 
financial crisis as the latter mainly affected the large urban centres of the economy. 
Conversely, the Donets Basin as a whole was highly exposed to the effects of these crises 
owing to its outdated industrial structure (coal mining, iron and steel industry). This led to 
a rearrangement in the ranking of the east Ukrainian regions based on GDP per capita: 
Dnipropetrovs’k overtook Donets’k, and the Dnieper Region (including Zaporizhzhia) has 
a higher output per capita than Donbas. A significant part of the productive capacities and 
incomes are found in the Donbas, an area hit hard by the fighting; their loss would further 
deteriorate the state of the country’s economy. The fighting in the Donbas that did by far 
the greatest harm to the economy among the post-Soviet conflicts. It happened in a period 
when Ukraine, after the transformation crisis, had been on the path of growth for more than 
one decade. Concerning population number, area and economic weight, the Donbas 
exceeds Transnistria or Karabakh by an order of magnitude. 
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Introduction 
The European Union merely found itself facing a new challenge when the new government 
of Ukraine, formed in February 2014, announced its willingness to accept the associated 
membership offered by the organization. The Russian reaction, which took the western 
world by surprise, had driven Ukraine – hitherto balancing between the EU and Common 
Economic Space dominated by the Russian Federation – into a stalemate. As the conflict 
deepened, the EU was forced to change its policy toward Ukraine. It had to commit to  
integration in response to the country’s new leadership, which was now urging them to do 
so; a great responsibility for both economies. The EU’s intention is to integrate a country 
of significant territory and a population of 45 million, whilst combating a number of 
economic issues. Whereas, Ukraine will place its centuries-old economic and cultural 
relations with Russia on an entirely new basis. The question marks only kept on 
multiplying in 2014, when politics seemed to neglect economic realities.  
Despite the new geopolitical situation, little is known about the real economics of 
Ukraine and its internal spatial disparities. After overcoming the transformation crisis of 
the 1990s, the country produced  spectacular annual GDP growth (5–10%) in the first half 
of the 2000s (official data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine). This development 
has slowed since 2005 and eventually was broken by the global crisis in 2008. Although 
GDP recovered after the drastic (15%) drop of 2009, and showed 3–5% increase in 2010–
11, hardly any growth was recorded in 2012–13. The stability of the state economy 
collapsed, debts rocketed, and the country otherwise strangled by corruption was forced to 
take out an IMF loan. Simultaneously, the bitter fighting between the Orange and Russia-
oriented political elites not only hampered internal socio-economic reforms but 
emphasised the east–west spatial division of the country ever more dramatically. The 
events in February 2014, initially brought about a western–nationalistic turn in Kyiv and 
in the west of the country; this was followed by separatist riots in the east that enjoyed 
political and military support from Russia. By March, the conflict escalated to an 
international level. The economic problems of Ukraine thus became disguised by the (civil) 
war and the Russian intervention in the Crimea and east Ukraine. 
The historical and cultural background of the east–west division within the country was 
highlighted in a previous study (Karácsonyi et al. 2014). Although an analysis of the 
conflict (Crimea, Donets Basin) is not included here, nevertheless, it might be important 
to raise the following questions: Does this division also appear in the level of economic 
development; Have differences in the level of regional development played their part in 
deepening the economic and then the political crisis, or was it the conflict that had a strong 
effect on regional disparities; and in general, how did the global crisis exacerbate the 
inequalities  already existing in Ukraine? 
Due to the significance of the country, geographers and economists in Ukraine and 
abroad have dealt with socio-economic conditions extensively (Åslund 2005 and 2008, 
Balabanov et al. 2003, Mrinska 2004, Van Zon et al. 1998, Van Zon 2001). A number of 
researchers emphasized that Ukraine inherited essential regional disparities from the Soviet 
period which were strengthened after 1990 (Mykhnenko–Swain 2010, Shablii 2001, 
Libanova et al. 2012). The adverse effect of the regional asymmetry and east-west 
dichotomy in Ukraine significantly deepened during 1990s (Gukalova 2009, Skryzhevska 
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2008). Mykhnenko and Swain argued that the predominance of centripetal over centrifugal 
drivers of regional development explains the persistence and divergence of the country’s 
space-economy (Mykhnenko–Swain 2010). Zubarevich showed that the economic 
inequality of regions in terms of GDP per capita increased until 2008. This was caused by 
the weakness of the Ukrainian state with a financial shortfall for its redistribution policy 
(Zuberevich 2010). Lane stressed on the different responses of the CIS and New EU 
member countries to the financial and economic crisis of 2007 onwards. The firsts were 
relatively less dependent on, and less integrated into the world financial system. 
Consequently, direct contagion from the global financial crisis, although significant, had 
less impact on them. Future economic scenarios for Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, involve 
not only exchange with the world system, but greater domestic development (Lane 2011). 
Mezentsev, Pidgrushnyi and Mezentseva focused on economic and social factors of the 
regional inequalities in Ukraine and the multi-layered character of the socio-spatial 
polarization (Mezentsev–Pidgrushnyi–Mezentseva 2014). More recently, OECD (2014) 
published a lengthy report on the inequalities in the country.  
However, as a rule, these studies are vague in a spatial sense as they focus on the general 
aspects of politics and economics;  there are also problems with databases suitable for 
territorial analyses. Taking into account that an average oblast in Ukraine corresponds to 
the EU NUTS-2 level size, it becomes obvious that only very vague, highly generalised 
regional trends could be deduced from the survey at this level. It compares to Germany 
being analysed at the level of Länder. Moreover, two of the 27 entities, notably Kyiv and 
Sevastopol’ are not regions but national-level subordinated municipalities. This leads to a 
high dispersion of the resulting values with respect to areas, population numbers or 
incomes. Even in possession of reliable data at county (oblast) level, only a very general 
picture can be obtained about the disparities. 
Therefore, this resolution should be refined with the involvement of district/rayon data. 
Such detailed analyses were carried out by Baranovsky (2007, 2009, 2010). Economic data 
at rayon level on a national scale have been available since the early 2000s. The narrow 
spectrum of the data is counterbalanced by the ca. five hundred territorial units providing 
a minute picture of the inequalities. In addition, due to the higher number of elements, a 
broader scale of methods can be applied to the regional analyses. For the sake of 
comparison: the area of these rayons is still more than twice the size of the Hungarian 
statistical (micro-)regions (LAU-1). 
Rayon level database – a closer approach 
In the survey of regional disparities, data on the incomes, employment and unemployment 
were involved, completed by those on migration and age structure of the population. These 
data (in a unified compilation of topics) are available at the rayon level in the statistical 
yearbooks of oblasts. There are no data on the economy at a higher spatial resolution (by 
settlement) or a normalized spatial database similar to T-star (of the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office) or EUROSTAT. Consequently, the authors had to produce one. 
Recently, there were attempts in Ukraine to publish demography data in an electronic 
database but the indicators are meagre, and it only includes the last two years of data.  
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For the sake of comparability, a spatial database was established that eliminated the 
administrative changes over the recent past (668 rayons in 2000 and 674 rayons in 2012). 
The number of rayons is 674 (2014), but of these, 184 are urban settlements of rayon status, 
i.e. enclaves within rayons (city municipalities of regional /i.e. oblast/ significance). Their 
data had to be aggregated with those of the enclosing rayon to reach an adequate dispersion 
of spatial extension (Karácsonyi 2010). In the course of the aggregation, the weighted 
average wages were accepted where the number of the employed persons represented the 
weight. After aggregation in the estimation of the unemployment rate, the weight was again 
the number employed. The ultimate database contained 501 entities of the rayon level data, 
showing much lower dispersions in comparison with the initial dataset, both in real 
(V674=68,3%; V501=39,3%) and population (V674=213,7%; V501=203,9%) dimensions 
(Karácsonyi 2010). 
There exist two interpretations of what comprises employment in Ukraine. In a strict 
sense, this group consists of wage and salary earners or employees (payroll employees), 
but small enterprises and private entrepreneurs are excluded from the dataset. These people 
are employed in factories (industry), on farms (agriculture), in offices (state administration) 
or in private firms (services), and receive a regular (monthly) salary for their work. Their 
number at county (oblast) and district (rayon) levels is published in statistics; even average 
nominal wages are determined and calculated from these data. Only part of the total volume 
of incomes appears and represents per capita incomes indirectly. In a wider sense, small 
entrepreneurs and persons pursuing agricultural activities are also included among the 
employed (as well as employees proper). In the early 1990s, more than 90% of workers 
were wage and salary earners (overwhelmingly employed by the state) i.e. factory workers, 
office employees or kolkhoz peasants. During the period of economic transformation, their 
ratio almost halved (55% in 2003), and they were replaced by small entrepreneurs and 
individual farmers (under economic pressure). The process of the decrease in wage and 
salary earners culminated in 2004, with a slow growth in their number in 2005–2006. 
The ratio of those working in small enterprises exceeded 50%, which means that about 
half of the employed persons do not appear in rayon-level data. The number of people 
working for small businesses grew by 35% between 2000 and 2013 and is estimated at  
10 million (Table 1). Their share is the highest in Transcarpathia, however, since  
2003–2004, they represent ca. half of employment in the western part of the country. In 
contrast, in the eastern Donets’k oblast they have the lowest share, which can be explained 
by the high dependence of local employment on big enterprises and the minor role of 
private initiatives. The average wages of people working in small businesses lag behind 
those of the other employees, thus despite their high ratio, they do not have a significant 
impact on the regional income disparities. Concerning employment rates, only 
approximate figures can be deduced at rayon level.  
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Table 1 
Employment in Ukraine 
Year  Payroll  employees 
Employees in small 
enterprises (1000) 
Ratio of total 
employment (%) 
1995 18 252 5 473 23 
2000 13 678 7 591 35.7 
2001 12 931 8 085 38.5 
2002 12 235 9 144 42.8 
2003 11 711 9 738 45.4 
2004 11 316 8 980 44.2 
2005 11 388 9 292 44.9 
2006 11 433 9 297 44.8 
2007 11 413 9 491 45.4 
2008 11 390 9 582 45.7 
2009 10 653 9 538 47.2 
2010 10 604 9 662 47.7 
2011 10 556 9 768 48.1 
2012 10 589 9 765 48.0 
2013 10 164 10 240 50.2 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
The real scale of unemployment could only be deduced from the contraction of the 
number of the employed. These data – like anywhere else – can be obtained by two 
methods: by using ILO methodology and from the number of registered unemployed at the 
State Service of Employment. Nowhere in the world do these data coincide, but in Ukraine 
they differ considerably. The ratio of jobless according to ILO (7.4% in 2013) is more than 
twice as high as that calculated from the registered unemployed (1.8% in 2013). It might 
be taken for granted that real parameters of unemployment are closer to the figures 
obtained through ILO methodology.  
Rates calculated from registered unemployment, and a database of the number of wage 
and salary earners and their average nominal wages broken down by rayon are made 
available for public use. The rigid regulation of registered unemployment hardly represents 
actual unemployment, but it is likely to reflect spatial disparities. An attempt was made to 
calculate disparities in the employment ratio and per capita incomes at rayon level from 
the raw indicator values, i.e. from average nominal wages and number of employees (Table 
2). For calculating the actual employment ratio, the population in working age (15–64 
years) was only available for 2012. Therefore, in the previous years, the number of 
employees was related to the total population, and so was influenced by the age structure.  
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Table 2 
Absolute and specific variables of the labour market in Ukraine by rayon 
Absolute variables Source 
Total number of employed  Unpublished by rayon 
Number of employees  Published by rayon 
Number of unemployed Unpublished by rayon 
Total volume of income of all employed Unpublished by rayon  
Total volume of wages Calculated from average wages multiplied by the number of 
  employees 
Specific variables Source 
Average nominal wages of employees Published by rayon 
Unemployment ratio Published by rayon 
Employment ratio Calculated from number of employees compared to the  
  total population (2003-2012)/working age population (2012) 
Incomes per capita Calculated from the total volume of wages to the population 
Source: own compilation. 
In the course of the analysis, beyond the mapping of the data and more simple 
descriptive statistics, other indicators of disparities (for example concentration rate, 
Hoover Index, relative dispersion) were deployed as well. The survey had to be started by 
filtering out errors in the rayon-level database. Along with typist’s literal mistakes, there 
were cases when individual values could not be explained by socio-economic reasons. If 
the error was obvious, estimations came to the fore. However, Derzhkomstat has tended to 
modify data on unemployment, and the sets published at a later date differed from the 
initial one; in these cases only long-term trends can be observed. Otherwise data on the 
labour market provide a rather mosaic picture about the country as they depend on the 
topography of large urban centres, but the dynamics of several years make certain regional 
processes discernible. 
Spatial disparities in the economy 
Demographic background of the economy – “worker” and “entrepreneur” Ukraine 
Since the proclamation of independence, Ukraine – along with the economic crisis – has 
also had to face demographic decline (Skryzhevska–Karácsonyi 2012). It threatens to have 
a considerable detrimental effect on society, the economy and human resources 
respectively. Between the two previous censuses (1989 and 2001), the total population of 
Ukraine contracted by 7.5% i.e. by 3.8 million persons. Between 2001 and 2014, it shrank 
by a further 3 million and was estimated to have been 45.2 million in 2014. Despite a 
considerable outmigration from the country, the contraction is mainly caused by a natural 
decline (Skrizhevska–Karácsonyi 2012). 
The ageing index (elder-child ratio) points to an unfavourable demography pattern that 
accelerated particularly between 2004 and 2007. It means that more elderly people have 
lived in the country than children since 2004. Due to a persistent growth in the birth rate 
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in the 2000s, there has been an increase in the ratio of those in the child age group. The 
death rate has shown a downward trend, but the natural decrease still accounts for an annual 
3-4‰. 
Based on the natural change in the population, the country’s territory can be divided 
into clearly separable regions, also reflected by their age structure. The ratio of the 
working-age population is the lowest in the central rural areas owing to the rapid ageing 
(Figure 1), whereas, it is the highest in the urban agglomerations. Within the rural 
population, the ratio of elderly people reaches its maximum in the north-eastern part of the 
country. In the eastern Donbas, the share of the elderly is considerable, even in the urban 
population. Although, the ageing is not so advanced as in the north-east, where there has 
been a natural decrease since the 1970s. The western regions (the Carpathians and 
Volhynia) are characterized by a more balanced, younger age structure and high natural 
increase. 
Figure 1 
Working age population in Ukraine, 2012 
 
Source: own compilation. 
Following the turn of the millennium, the economically active segment of the age group 
between 15–70 years included more than 22 million people, whereas the population of 
working age (females between 15 and 54, males between 15 and 59 years) numbered 20.5 m. 
These figures represent 62% and 71% activity rates, respectively. It should be noted that the 
data obtained by different methods might vary considerably. For instance, the census of 
2001 put working-age economic activity at a mere 65.5%. Economic activity has been on 
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the rise since 2004 (with the exception of 2009), despite that stemming from the shrinking 
population, it dropped below 22 m by 2013 among people aged between 15 and 70 years. 
The overwhelming part of the economically active population consists of 20.4 m 
employed people as of 2012. The 1990s saw a dramatic decrease, that accelerated between 
1995 and 2000, of 3.5 m people. Since 2001, some positive changes seem to have occurred, 
i.e. there has been a stabilising trend and even growth in the number of employed. The 
global economic crisis of 2008 had a negative impact on employment, and to a large extent, 
it was not able to reach 2005 levels even in 2013. The highest employment rate figures for 
wage and salary earners are found in the environs of large cities, with the trend rising 
eastward (Figure 2). These data, however, do not include those private entrepreneurs and 
small enterprises, which could add a lot to the figures in the western part of the country 
and urban regions. 
Figure 2 
Rate of employment, 2012 
 
Source: own compilation. 
The level of economic development is also reflected in migration movement (Massey 
2004) as people move towards regions offering the most favourable economic conditions. 
Regional wage differences play a decisive part in the spatial distribution of migrants 
(Hatton, Wiliamson 2005). Urban centres are also the primary target areas in Ukraine, 
where a broad spectrum of labour opportunities is available. The Kyiv metropolitan region 
receives the largest number of migrants, and the eastern industrial agglomerations are 
attractive, except for the two main centres of Luhans’k and Donets’k hit by outmigration. 
Despite the inward movement, for urban centres in the east (Kharkiv, Dnieper Region), in-
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migration is unable to counterbalance the natural decrease. Alongside migration from the 
countryside to urban settlements as a characteristic feature of the Soviet era, there appeared 
suburbanization on the urban fringe and desurbanization in rural areas. Along with the 
necessity (not welfare) outflow, the marine coastal zones located relatively close to big 
cities are becoming the primary target areas. Odesa region or the southern seaside of the 
Crimea on the Black Sea might become the Ukrainian sunbelt in the future, however, the 
future of the Crimea is now a question. 
Figure 3 
Migration, 2012 
 
Source: own compilation. 
The role of the regions in Ukraine in international labour migration varies significantly. 
Western areas of the country are a major donor to international labour migration, involving 
about 11% of the population of working age. (Ukraina. Mihratsiinyi profil’, 2013). It 
should be stated that the majority (over 54%) of labour migrants from Ukraine are from 
rural areas, 66% of them are male, and their average age is 36.2 years. Labour migrants are 
characterized by a lower level of education than the national average level of the population 
(Malynovska 2011). 
Urban regions as development poles 
According to the classic perception, the spatial pattern of economic development is 
opposite to the Central European west to east slope. Moving eastward there is a rise in the 
development level. Actually average nominal wages, employment and unemployment at 
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the county level showed a massive east-west slope in the mid-1990s (R2=0.49), but that 
resulted from the transformation crisis (Dövényi–Karácsonyi 2008); since then, it has 
decreased considerably. Such a significant correlation with geographical longitude cannot 
be demonstrated either at  county or rayon level (Figure 4), i.e. spatial disparities on a 
national scale are not to be deduced from the east–west division. 
Figure 4 
Variations of incomes and the east–west dimension 
 
 
Source: own compilation.  
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Figure 5 
Monthly income to the country average in 2000 and 2012 
 
Source: own compilation. 
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Rayon-level data on average nominal wages, employment and unemployment, are 
functions of the distance from urban centres (r>0.4) and the level of urbanization (r>0.5) 
(Table 3). Wages and salaries well above the average are to be found in large cities and 
industrial centres, whereas extremely low wages are a characteristic of expansive rural 
areas, especially of mid-west Ukraine (Figure 5). Differences in incomes reflect a 
considerable gap between urban and rural areas. The huge disparities of urbanization across 
the country mean that 65% of rural inhabitants live in the western part of the country, where 
the rural population share is 44%. An even more nuanced picture emerges if we exclude 
Kyiv’s 2.8 million inhabitants. In this case, urban dwellers account for only half of western 
Ukraine’s population. In contrast, urban dwellers account for 78% of the population in the 
eastern part of the country. In regions comprising the major industrial centres, e.g. in the 
Donets Basin, the inhabitants live almost exclusively in urban areas. Along with Kyiv, the 
eastern regions (Donets’k, Dnipropetrovs’k and Zaporizhzhia) produce an overwhelming 
part of the GDP and industrial output (Maksymenko 2000). Odesa is the only 1 million 
population city falling outside the area delineated by Kyiv–Dnipropetrovs’k–Donets’k–
Kharkiv. (The population of Odesa was below 1 million in 2012-13, although by 2014, it 
was again over 1 million.) Apart from Lviv, there are only minor economic centres in the 
western half of the country. 
Eastern regions are not more developed as a whole, but they accommodate large urban 
centres representing growth poles. There are less developed peripheral rural areas around 
them, as is demonstrated by the higher dispersion of the average wages and salaries. 
The relationship between the average wages and eastern longitude of setting became 
increasingly accidental in the first half of the 2000s, and the close connection with 
urbanization also vanished with the improvement of the economic situation in the hitherto 
extremely poor rural areas. In the 2000s, especially after the global crisis the eastern 
regions gradually lost their relative favourable position, while urban growth poles were as 
a rule hit hard by the economic crisis. 
Table 3 
Correlation between average wages, urbanization and eastern longitudes on rayon level 
r, n=501 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Urbanization 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.50 
Longitude  (λ) 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 
Source: own calculation. 
Polarization and levelling – effects of the crises 
Similar to the countries of the East European region, transformation of the economy has 
been accompanied both by growing social inequalities and widening spatial disparities 
(Mykhnenko–Swain 2010, Skryzhevska 2008, Mezentsev–Pidgrushnyi–Mezentseva 
2014). Spatial differences grew most rapidly during the period of economic decline (1990–
2000). In 1985, nominal wages in Kyiv city hardly exceeded the average in the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic; by 2001, they represented 1.8-fold value of the national average. 
As far as average wages and employment are concerned, the number of spatial units with 
figures above average continiued to shrink during the 2000s. This means that the growth 
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was maintained by poles less in number but being considerably stronger in the early 2010s 
than a decade before. 
In spite of the increasing polarization, the regional differences showed a downward 
trend in average wages and salaries because the previous extreme low figures remaining 
below half the national average had disappeared from the western regions (Figure 5). 
Paradoxically, levelling of average wages was caused partly by the apparently growing 
inequalities of employment (Figure 6). When calculating average income, a growing 
number of small enterprises could not be taken into account; nor were they included in the 
employment figures During the 2000s, employment (without small enterprises) could only 
rise in the large urban regions while decreasing in the rest of the country. Under the impact 
of transformation, farming-related workplaces with low wages and salaries disappeared 
primarily in the western rural areas, while private and small entrepreneurship came to the 
fore for economic reasons. Average wages have thus significantly increased in these 
peripheral rural regions. 
Spatial disparities were mitigated during the two years following the global financial 
crisis as the latter mainly affected the large urban centres of the economy. Since 2011, the 
labour market has undergone a real differentiation in the wake of the recovery of urban 
regions from the crisis. Since 2009, the employment ratio increased mainly in the eastern 
regions of the country with a higher level of urbanization. Nevertheless, while in the 
Dnieper Region and Kharkiv, employment has been raised significantly, the Donets Basin 
could improve its positions only slightly. Even during the last decade, rising employment 
was only recorded in the cities of Donets’k and Luhans’k i.e. in the oblast centres. 
Entrepreneurial activity has been lower in the eastern regions as they depend 
overwhelmingly on the large industrial enterprises, and this exacerbated the general crisis 
here. Coal mining, determinant in the southeastern part of the basin, could only survive on 
state subsidies. 
Figure 6 
Spatial disparities of average wages, employment and unemployment 
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Source: own calculation. 
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entrepreneurial activity of the population. Extreme unemployment values in this case show 
maximum dispersion; this can be attributed to the low figures in urban agglomerations and 
high ones in the rural spaces (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 
Unemployment 2003, 2012 
 
Source: own compilation. 
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From crisis to separatism or crisis due to separatism? 
Following the transformation crisis, and especially after the global financial collapse, the 
large urban spaces (Kyiv, Kharkiv metropolitan regions and agglomerations along the 
Dnieper River), were as a rule able to improve their economic position and recover from a 
considerable decline. The industry of the cities along the Dnieper consists of high-tech 
companies (missile and aerospace technology, Mrinska 2004). However, the Donets Basin 
as a whole was highly exposed to the effects of these crises owing to its outdated industrial 
structure (coal mining, iron and steel industry). This led to a rearrangement in the ranking 
of the east Ukrainian regions based on GDP per capita: Dnipropetrovs’k overtook 
Donets’k, and the Dnieper Region (including Zaporizhzhia) now has a higher output per 
capita than Donbas. 
The Donets Basin has the most aged population on a national basis, and a large-scale 
outmigration has stricken the region. Whereas, the western regions are the primary source  
of migration towards the EU (Malynovska 2011). From the eastern part of the country 
(particularly from the less prospective Donets Basin), many young native Russian speakers 
have migrated to Russia, with the Moscow Metropolitan Region as the main target area 
(Zapadniuk 2011, Zovnishnia trudova migratsiia 2009). 
The western half of the country was the most successful area of the 2000s, having risen 
from significant underdevelopment to close to the national average. In the marginal zone 
located close to the EU, that used to be a neglected border zone during Soviet times, 
unemployment dropped considerably as a result of the mushrooming small enterprises and 
foreign capital investment. Regional inequalities have been on the decrease between east 
and west, testifying to a relative devaluation of eastern Ukraine’s position. 
To sum up: a parallel cannot be drawn between the east–west economic dichotomy and 
recent political processes. Even though there is a close correlation between the ratio of 
Russian speakers and higher average wages, this might be attributed to the Russian 
minority mostly living in the urban areas (Table 4). The weakening correlation and shift of 
the centre of gravity of incomes towards the north-east are a clear indication of the eastern 
regions (including Russian-speaking ethnic blocks) having lost their absolute economic 
leadership. 
Table 4 
Correlation between average incomes and native tongue of the population on rayon level  
(%) 
Denomination 2000 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Ukrainian speakers –0.39 –0.39 –0.38 –0.35 –0.35 –0.34 –0.32 –0.30 –0.30 –0.29 –0.29 
Russian speakers 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Source: own calculation. 
Areas in Donbas hit by the armed conflict extend all over this industrial region. The 
simplest method to measure economic effects is to examine economic indicators of the 
rayons affected by the conflict (Figure 8). The involvement of the individual rayons in the 
hostilities can be estimated through the turnover in the presidential elections of 05.25.2014 
by rayon in Donets’k and Luhans’k oblasts. Those rayons, where the number of voters 
lagged behind the figures usual “in peacetime” or where the election did not take place at 
all, were obviously outside of Ukrainian central government control. In these areas, the 
government made an attempt to re-establish its power by armed intervention in June 
through August 2014. 
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Figure 8 
Distribution of population and incomes in Ukraine and the areas affected  
by the armed conflict 
 
Source: own compilation. 
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Donets’k and Luhans’k oblasts were characterized by indicator values over the national 
average in every respect between 2003 and 2012. The only exceptions were the years of 
the global crisis starting with 2008, when unemployment rose (Table 5). The average 
wages were not lower than ten years previously. The opposite was true throughout Crimea 
and Sevastopol’, where indicator values remained below average. The problem with the 
official statistics rests with the missing data on small enterprises. The economy of the urban 
regions in east Ukraine and especially that of the Donbas is much more sensitive to central 
government subsidies than the economy in the western part of the country, which is 
supported by a strong sector of small enterprises. Cancellation of central subsidies or 
elimination of the economic cooperation between Russia and Ukraine might seriously 
affect whole branches of industry with significant numbers of workplaces, and provoke 
social unrest. The economic roots of the conflict thus rest with the dependence on state 
subsidies provided by central government. Clashes in the Donbas have their origin in 
politics; the outdated structure of the economy plays only a relative and indirect part. 
Table 5 
Economic indicators for the Crimea and the rayons of Donets’k and Luhans’k oblasts 
affected by the fighting in 2014* 
 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Average wages to the country average 
Crimea 92.3 92.2 92.3 91.6 90.4 91.3 91.6 89.2 89.5 
Donets’k 116.8 118.6 115.0 114.2 112.0 111.3 115.7 117.8 116.3 
Luhans’k 111.2 110.0 107.8 109.0 108.7 109.1 112.2 114.3 112.5 
 Per capita incomes to the country average 
Crimea 85.2 84.7 82.7 83.0 81.6 84.8 95.2 81.7 79.7 
Donets’k 125.4 130.9 127.6 128.0 125.7 122.2 141.6 133.1 131.0 
Luhans’k 117.1 119.7 118.1 120.9 121.6 120.6 140.8 132.7 130.5 
 Employees to the total population 
Ukraine 25.3 24.8 25.0 25.0 25.1 23.6 21.5 23.1 23.5 
Crimea 23.3 22.8 22.4 22.7 22.6 21.9 22.3 21.1 21.0 
Donets’k 27.1 27.4 27.8 28.0 28.1 25.9 26.2 26.1 26.5 
Luhans’k 26.6 27.0 27.4 27.7 28.0 26.1 26.9 26.8 27.3 
 Unemployment 
Ukraine 3.35 2.76 2.40 1.94 2.41 1.75 1.68 1.50 1.53 
Crimea 2.94 2.12 1.62 1.21 1.55 1.18 1.23 1.36 1.24 
Donets’k 2.59 1.98 1.63 1.15 1.78 1.40 1.08 0.89 0.95 
Luhans’k 2.02 1.45 1.28 1.01 1.49 1.00 0.86 0.73 0.84 
* Donetsk and Luhansk affected by fighting area calculated from the data of presidential election in Ukraine (25.05.2014) – 
rayons where were no elections, or partly no elections (as not controlled by the central government). 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
The armed conflict is expected to have far-reaching and more serious implications for 
the economy than any of the previous crises. Because of the anticipated flight of capital, 
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the lag between the Donbas and the rest of the urban regions will widen, stemming from 
the unfavourable industrial structure of the former. 
A significant part of the productive capacities and incomes are to be found in the 
Donbas, hit hard by the fighting; their loss would further deteriorate the state of the 
country’s economy. Already, in autumn 2014, restrictions to energy consumption had to 
be introduced because of the fall in coal production of Donbas, as the latter has a direct 
impact on national GDP. The armed conflict has extended over an area equivalent to half 
of Hungary, making up 7% of the country’s territory. Here, more than one-fifth of the 
working-age population and one-quarter of the employed live; more than 25% of GDP is 
produced here (Table 6). The Russian–Ukrainian conflict affects 10 million people 
(including the Crimea). All this means that one-quarter of the economic assets were not 
under the control of the central government in 2014, which will lead to a spectacular 
shrinkage of GDP. Taking into account an overall national decline of 10% and adding the 
fall shared by the areas affected by the conflict, the general decline might increase up to 
30–40%. 
Table 6 
Affected area, population and income during the war in 2014  
– estimated from 2012 rayon level data* 
Area Area (km2) Population (persons) 
15–65 years old 
population 
(persons) 
Employees 
(1000 persons) 
Total incomes 
(1000 UAH, 
2012 prices) 
Crimea 25,830 2,333,524 1,654,926 488.9 1,322,481 
Donets’k 21,767 4,271,386 3,020,356 1,132.5 3,979,016 
Luhans’k 17,602 3,467,487 2,490,526 946.5 3,218,386 
Donbas total 39,369 7,738,873 5,510,882 2079 7,197,402 
Total 65,199 10,072,397 7,165, 808 2,567.9 8,519,883 
In % (Ukraine =100%)      
Crimea 4.3 5.1 5.2 4.6 4.1 
Donets’k 3.6 9.4 9.4 10.6 12.3 
Luhans’k 2.9 7.6 7.8 8.8 10.0 
Donbas total 6.6 17.0 17.2 19.4 22.3 
Total 10.9 22.2 22.4 24.0 26.4 
* In case of Donets’k and Luhans’k only rayons affected by the fighting. Donetsk and Luhansk affected by fighting area 
calculated from the data of presidential election in Ukraine (25.05.2014) – rayons where were no elections, or partly no elections 
(as not controlled by the central government). 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
It would be difficult to predict the long-term effects of the crisis because its end is not 
yet in sight. According to one scenario, Russia is to retain its military influence in the 
Donets Basin and to keep the local industry working through subsidized energy prices, 
similar to Transnistria. In this case, the Donbas will be unable to rely on the influx of 
foreign capital to modernize its industry. There has been a large-scale outmigration further 
deteriorating the otherwise unfavourable age structure. 
If the Kyiv central government fails to resume its control over the Donets Basin, it 
might be a limiting factor for economic and international orientation of Ukraine in the 
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future. It should be emphasized that this is a merely new but at the same time quite familiar 
situation in the post-Soviet space. The Donets Basin and the Crimea just add to the frozen 
post-Soviet crises in Transnistria, Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia – but there are 
differences in the spatial dimensions and timing. The present conflict arose more than 
twenty years after the disintegration of the USSR and following the “freezing” of the other 
post-Soviet clashes, in a delayed historical context. There are two reasons for this. First, in 
the early 1990s, a conflict of this kind could have threatened a clash of two nuclear powers, 
as Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons stockpile only with the Budapest Memorandum 
signed in 1994; in exchange, the great powers (among them the Russian Federation) 
provided security assurances. Second, Russia of the time teased by the events in 
Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Tajikistan and Chechnya could not undertake 
such a conflict. The size and economic importance of the region affected by the conflict 
(Table 7) indicate that among the post-Soviet conflicts so far, it was the fighting in the 
Donbas that did by far the greatest harm to the economy. It happened in a period when 
Ukraine, after the transformation crisis, had been on the path of growth for more than a 
decade. Concerning population, area and economic weight, the Donbas exceeds 
Transnistria or Karabakh by magnitude. Some 10 million people are affected in an area 
two-thirds of Hungary (65 thousand sq. km). Ukraine would barely be able to solve its 
economic problems using only internal resources. Moreover, the whole post-Soviet space 
just having started to recover from the decline caused by the global crisis might sink into 
a deep economic depression. 
Table 7 
Size of “frozen and hot” conflicts in post-Soviet space 
Conflict area Country Date (since) Area (1000 km2) 
Population 
around 2010 
(1000 
persons) 
Ratio of the 
country’s 
area (%) 
Ratio of the 
country’s 
population 
(%) 
Transnistria Moldova 1990 4.1 505 12.0 12.5 
South Ossetia Georgia 1991 3.9 51 5.7 1.0 
Abkhazia Georgia 1992 8.6 242 12.4 5.0 
Nagorno Karabakh Azerbaijan 1991 11.4 146 13.0 1.5 
Crimea Ukraine 2014 25.8 2,300 4.3 5.1 
Donbas Ukraine 2014 ~39 ~7,700 ~6.6 ~17 
Source: own calculation from the data published by the statistical offices of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the 
above-mentioned non-recognized countries. 
Conclusions 
The spatial disparities of economic life in Ukraine are consequences of the inequalities in 
the level of urbanization characterized by a massive west–east dichotomy. The spatial 
pattern of the economy is also dualistic, with the entrepreneurial western areas vs. the 
eastern regions depending on the large industrial enterprises. During the take-off of the 
economy following the transformation crisis, disparities tended to grow; the global crisis 
then temporarily reduced the advantage of the growth poled. At the same time, the relative 
position of the Donets Basin within the country deteriorated due to the overwhelmingly 
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uncompetitive industries. The present problems of the economy are rooted in the 
postponement of the economic reforms and an outdated structure that has been exacerbated 
by the global crisis. Although spatial inequalities lessened during the initial years after the 
crisis, the small enterprise sector in the west and urban regions, with a more competitive 
economic structure, managed to overcome the crisis  in a relatively short time. 
The present conflict did not originate from the growing spatial disparities or the lagging 
of the eastern territories. It stemmed from an east anxious that in the case of a possible 
western orientation, the less competitive sectors of the economy might be eliminated, with 
a special reference to the Donbas. Damage caused to the economy by the warfare exceed 
the combined loss during the conflicts since the disintegration of the USSR, due to the 
utmost economic importance of the affected Donbas. One-fifth of the economy of Ukraine 
virtually vanished; in addition, the world is facing a new geopolitical situation in the post-
Soviet space, one that threatens to thoroughly rearrange the further orientation of future 
integrations. 
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